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THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN
CALIFORNIA-AN EVOLUTION
OF THE SPECIES
Section 1021.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure codifies
the California Supreme Court's holding in Serrano v. Priest, or-
dering payment of attorneys'fees to plaintiffs who vindicate im-
portant public policies and confer benefits on the public. This
Comment examines how Section 1021.5 has been applied over the
last three years. In particular, the Comment analyzes the policy
behind the private attorney general fee award and attempts to
define "important public policy" "substantial benefits," "dispro-
portionate burden'; and "enforcement" as they are used in the
context of Section 1021.5.
INTRODUCTION
The traditional American Rule requires a party to pay his own
attorneys' fees.1 Nevertheless, for over a decade the courts have
recognized that the rule is ill-fitted to increasingly prevalent pub-
lic interest litigation. This type of legal action results in only
small benefits to the individual plaintiff and thus is frequently not
economically feasible. This consideration, combined with the in-
ability of public enforcement agencies to pursue every meritori-
ous claim, produced the need for an exception to the American
Rule. That exception is the private attorney general doctrine,
2
which relieves a successful public interest litigant of the financial
burden of attorney's fees.
In 1977 California embraced the private attorney general doc-
trine. Almost simultaneously the legislature and Supreme Court
adopted very similar approaches to compensating successful pub-
1. For'a complete explanation of the evolution of the United States law in
this area see Note, Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974).
2. The term "private attorney general" was first used in a suit where the cen-
tral issue was standing to sue. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1943). It was first applied in an attorney fee setting in Newman v. Piggie Park En-
terprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See Note, supra note 1, at 658.
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lic interest litigants.3 Thus, the advisability of the doctrine, which
has been the subject of volumes of scholarly debate,4 is now a set-
tled issue in California. As California courts have labored to ap-
ply the new rule, however, it has become clear that questions
remain. This Comment addresses four of these questions:
1) How are the three criteria of the new rule to be construed?
2) When has a policy truly been enforced? 3) Are there different
considerations when the defendant is a private party rather than
a governmental entity? 4) What application does the doctrine
have in administrative proceedings?
BACKGROUND
The federal courts were the first to recognize the need to en-
courage meritorious public interest litigation through attorneys'
fee awards. The first fee awards were authorized by statute. 5 The
federal courts later began to award fees to successful plaintiffs
where there was no statutory authorization, basing the award in-
stead in the "inherent equitable powers" of the court.
6
No single formula was arrived at for determining when it was
proper to shift the fee burden under this approach. Two criteria
are found, however, in all the decisions invoking the rule: a judg-
ment by the court that "including attorneys' fees as costs is an ad-
ditional remedy necessary to effectuate the congressional
underpinnings of a substantial program,"7 and a finding that the
litigant's individual interest is minor but the alleged injury is to a
broad class and is extensive.8
The private attorney general doctrine became a well-accepted
rule in the federal courts. One court held that when fee shifting is
necessary "to eliminate the impediments to pro bono publico liti-
gation and to carry out congressional policy, an award of attor-
neys' fees not only is essential but also is legally required."9 That
rule was soon discarded, however.
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court dealt a fatal blow to
3. The California Supreme Court decided Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I1), 20
Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977), and the legislature enacted CAL.
CIV. PRoC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
4. Probably the most frequently cited article is Note, Court Awarded Attor-
ney Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974).
5. E.g., in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968), the basis of
the fee award was 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1964), which is the attorney fee provision
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
6. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1973), af0d, 550
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
7. Id.
8. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
9. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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the private attorney general doctrine at the federal level. In Aly-
eska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society'O the Court held that in-
herent in any application of the doctrine is a determination that
certain legislation is sufficiently important to warrant reallocation
of attorneys' fees in an effort to encourage private enforcement.
Such a determination, in the Court's view, is outside the judici-
ary's role; the relative importance of the enacted laws is a prob-
lem better left to the legislative branch. The Court established
the law that now governs in federal courts-absent statutory au-
thorization, all parties pay their own fees.
The California Supreme Court, in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano
III)," found the Alyeska decision unpersuasive. While the Cali-
fornia Court recognized the danger of intruding into the domain
of the legislature, it found no such danger when the litigation vin-
dicates a constitutional right.12 Constitutional provisions were
deemed to be of the requisite magnitude to warrant encourage-
ment of enforcement.
Serrano III announced three prerequisites to shifting attorneys'
fees under the private attorney general doctrine: 1) the public
policy vindicated must be of sufficient strength or societal impor-
tance; 2) the necessity for private enforcement and the resulting
burden on the plaintiff must be of sufficient magnitude; and 3) a
sufficiently large number of people must benefit from the litiga-
tion.'3 The court held that under the facts of Serrano II,14 the
landmark equality of school financing case, all three of these re-
quirements were met.
Coincident with the Serrano III opinion, the California legisla-
ture drafted its version of the private attorney general doctrine.
The result, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5,15 un-
10. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
11. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
12. Id. at 46, 569 P.2d at 1315, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
13. Id. at 25, 569 P.2d:at 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 327 (1977).
14. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
15. CAi. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 1021.5(West 1980) provides for attorney fees in
cases involving enforcement of important rights affecting the public interest:
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party
against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in
the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a
significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpenuniary, has been con-
ferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the
award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice
be paid out of the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving pub-
dermined any continued validity the Alyeska decision may have
enjoyed in California courts. The statute recognizes that fee real-
location is a valid method of encouraging private enforcement of
important public policies. It delegates to the courts the authority
to determine which policies are sufficiently important. The stat-
ute also states that statutory policies can be sufficiently important
to trigger application of the private attorney general doctrine; Ser-
rano III did not address this issue. Section 1021.5 differs from
Serrano III in only one other way. Whereas Serrano III requires
that there be a large "number of people standing to benefit from
the decision,"' 6 the statute requires that "a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, [be conferred] on the gen-
eral public or a large class of persons.""' Although the difference
in language seems slight, the statute's use of the words "signifi-
cant" and "class" has caused some to question the consistency of
the statute with Serrano 111.18 In all other ways the three criteria
adopted by Serrano III and section 1021.5 are identical.
THE PoLicY
The policy underlying section 1021.5 must be understood before
examining that section's application by the California courts.
The section is directed at the need to encourage private enforce-
ment of public policies.'9 "Encourage" is the key word. The doc-
trine is not a vehicle for rewarding litigants who have successfully
protected the public interest. The fee award is a means toward an
end, not an end in itself. The actual goal of the doctrine is stimu-
lating future public interest litigation. The doctrine is not
designed to punish those who violate the constitutional or statu-
tory rights of a substantial number of persons.20 The policy of en-
couragement is prospective rather than retrospective. The goal is
to convince attorneys that it is economically feasible to litigate in
the public interest when no compensation can be expected from
the client. Regardless of the amount of fees awarded, the statute
will be a failure if those awards do not stimulate public interest
litigation.
Courts applying the rule must strive for consistency and pre-
lic entities, this section applies to allowances against, but not in favor of,
public entities, and no claim shall be made required to be filed therefore.
16. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 45, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325
(1977).
17. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
18. See text accompanying notes 43-65 infra.
19. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 43, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324
(1977).
20. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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dictability above all else. Before an attorney can afford to put
months and even years into a case without being paid by the cli-
ent, his expectation of an attorneys' fee award in event of victory
must be fairly certain. To instill this confidence in potential de-
fenders of the public interest, the courts must clearly define and
consistently apply the criteria of the private attorney general doc-
trine. Judicial discretion in this area must always be explained
and should be confined by adherence to guidelines. Only in this
way will the requisite, cohesive body of precedent emerge.21
An examination of the California courts' application of Serrano
III and section 1021.5 requires analysis of two bodies of case law.
The first is comprised of the post-1977 California cases that have
applied the private attorney general doctrine. The second is the
pre-Alyeska federal decisions dealing with the doctrine. These
federal cases are persuasive authority in California because the
state supreme court, in the leading post-Serrano III private attor-
ney general case, 2 held that the cases are reliable authority in
California.23 This holding is based on the legislature's reliance on
these federal cases in drafting section 1021.5.
THE THREE CRM RIA OF THE PRiVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL RULE
"Important Right"
Serrano III and section 1021.5 both require that, before the pri-
vate attorney general doctrine will apply, the litigation must vin-
dicate an "important right." This criterion has been the most
21. Inconsistency not only undercuts the effectiveness of the private attorney
general doctrine, it also poses the threat that the rule will discourage public inter-
est litigation. This is because many public interest law firms are funded by chari-
table organizations and private foundations. This funding is usually on a short
term basis and is an unreliable source of future funding. See Calm & Cahn, Power
to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1005, 1007-08 '(1970). Frequently this funding is given with the under-
standing that it will be cut off if the recipient can support itself through attorney
fee awards. Such is the case with Public Advocates, Inc. of San Francisco, one of
the firms for plaintiff in Serrano III. Thus, the possibility exists that a few spo-
radic awards under section 1021.5 could convince charitable contributors there is
greater need for their assistance elsewhere. If the doctrine is consistently applied,
new public interest attorneys will be motivated to fill the void left by withdrawal
of these funds. Without consistency, however, only a void will result and the doc-
trine will be conterproductive.
22. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 593 P.2d 200,
154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979).
23. Id. at 934, 593 P.2d at 209, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12.
frequent target of criticism by commentators on California's pri-
vate attorney general law.24 The objection to use of this criterion
is that the subjectivity of the determination involved (the relative
importance of the right at issue) decreases the predictability of a
fee award. Also, the other two criteria adequately distinguish
public interest litigation from private disputes.25 The suggested
solution has been to assume that all constitutional and statutory
policies are of the requisite importance. The courts claim to have
rejected this approach. In Woodland Hills Residents Association
v. City Council of Los Angeles,26 the California Supreme Court
held that although the legislature had authorized fee-shifting
when either constitutional or statutory rights are vindicated, 27 the
courts nevertheless must be selective, because not all legislative
policies are "important."28 The court admitted that there is no
clear standard available but suggested that "in determining the
'importance' of the particular 'vindicated' right, courts should gen-
erally realistically assess the significance of that right in terms of
its relationship to achievement of fundamental legislative goals
(citations)." 29 Because a court theoretically must always try to
effect legislative intent when weighing the conflicting statutory
rights asserted by the litigants, this standard apparently turns on
the question of what legislative goals are "fundamental." The
substitution of "fundamental" for "important" does not, however,
make the determination any more objective.
California courts have consistently echoed the restrictive lan-
guage of Woodland Hills Residents AssociationO but if we follow
Justice Holmes' advice and look to what the courts do rather than
what they say,31 it becomes clear that the courts are actually in-
terpreting this first criterion liberally. Only two of the cases since
1977 which considered the application of the private attorney gen-
eral rule have refused to award attorneys' fees to the successful
plaintiff because the rights and policies involved were not of suffi-
24. McDermott & Rothschild, The Supreme Court of California, 1976-1977-
Foreword. The Private Attorney General Rule and Public Interest Litigation in
California, 66 CALw. L. REV. 137 (1978).
25. Id. at 152.
26. 23 Cal. 3d 917, 593 P.2d 200, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979).
27. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
28. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 935, 593 P.2d
at 209, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 512 (1979).
29. Id. at 935-36, 593 P.2d at 209-10, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 512-13.
30. See, e.g., Marini v. Municipal Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 829, 836, 160 Cal. Rptr.
465, 469 (1979); Rich v. City of Benicia, 98 Cal. App. 3d 428, 437, 159 Cal. Rptr. 473,
478 (1979).
31. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
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cient importance. 32 Furthermore, neither of those cases refused
to award fees solely because of the triviality of the policies in-
volved; the courts relied more heavily on the failure of the plain-
tiffs' fee claims to meet other requirements of section 1021.5. A
successful litigant claiming attorneys' fees under California's pri-
vate attorney general rule has never been refused solely because
the policy vindicated by the litigation was deemed unimportant.
In AFL-CIO v. California Employment Development Depart-
ment,33 the court discussed the other two prerequisites to a fee
award34 and proceeded to award fees to the plaintiff without even
discussing the importance of the policies and rights involved.
This represents a reluctance by California courts to invade the
legislative domain. The courts recognize the subjectivity and leg-
islative function inherent in determining the propriety of a pri-
vate attorney general fee award on the basis of the relative
strength of the legislative policy at issue. Thus, in regard to statu-
tory policies in this setting, a presumption of importance is
evolving.
A factor contributing to the presumption's evolution is the be-
lief that specific statutory directives are linked to fundamental
rights and policies, putting the importance of those directives be-
yond question. For instance, in Gunn v. Employment Develop-
ment Department35 the plaintiff successfully challenged the
refusal of the defendant state agency to grant her unemployment
insurance benefits because she refused to reveal whether she was
pregnant. The court held that the first criterion of section 1021.5
was satisfied because the constitutionally protected right to pri-
vacy had been vindicated. That is, the court did not limit its anal-
ysis of the "important right" criterion to a consideration of
California Insurance Code section 1253, dealing with unemploy-
ment insurance benefits, but instead awarded fees based on vindi-
cation of article I of the California Constitution.
When a court traces a statute back to its most basic policy foun-
dation it is a rare piece of legislation indeed that is not linked to a
policy of prima facie importance. This is most evident in Wilder-
32. Amie v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 421, 160 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979); Bruno
v. Bell, 91 Cal. App. 3d 776, 154 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1979).
33. 88 Cal. App. 3d 811, 152 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1979).
34. These prerequisites are conferral of a benefit on a large class of people,
and sufficient need for and burden of private enforcement.
35. 94 Cal. App. 3d 658, 156 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1979).
ness Society v. Morton,3 6 a federal case specifically recognized by
the California Supreme Court as helpful in interpreting Califor-
nia's private attorney general law.3 7 In Wilderness Society, the
judgment for the plaintiff, who sought to stop construction of the
Alaska oil pipeline facilities, was based on a 1920 statutory restric-
tion on the width of such facilities.38 The court recognized that
the restriction was "anachronistic" and no longer consistent with
congressional intent; certainly the statute did not represent a pol-
icy which was either fundamental or important. The court found,
however, that the litigation enforced a different policy--that the
government follow proper procedure when enacting legislation.
According to the court, the litigation led to a more complete ex-
amination of the pipeline construction by Congress, including an
official abandonment of the 1920 width restriction. The court
awarded fees to the plaintiff for its effort in ensuring thorough-
ness in the legislative process.
The logical extension of this decision would completely destroy
any further relevance of the "important policy" criterion. When-
ever the courts recognize as correct a litigant's statutory interpre-
tation, the policy that the law will be properly enacted and
applied is furthered. Wilderness Society dramatically demon-
strates how a lawsuit can be viewed as furthering important gov-
ernmental policies although the specific basis for the judgment is
trivial.
Wilderness Society illustrates another factor which is endemic
to application of this first criterion of the private attorney general
doctrine-what constitutes a public interest? The dissenters in
Wilderness Society vehemently argued that the fee award was not
proper because the plaintiff was not acting in the public interest;
both popular opinion and congressional intent favored the pipe-
line. The dissenters asserted that the litigation actually was an
impediment to achievement of a goal which was in the public in-
terest.3 9 This issue plagues any discussion of public interest liti-
gation and is relevant in the context of the private attorney
general doctrine to the rule's first two criteria (important policy
and widespread benefit). There is no single public interest. Ef-
fectuation of a policy held dear by one group thwarts a policy ad-
vocated by others, and a benefit to one person is often a burden to
36. 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
37. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 938, 593 P.2d
at 211, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 514 (1979).
38. The Mineral Leasing Act, ch. 85, § 28, 41 Stat. 449 (1920) (current version at
30 U.S.C. § 185 (1980 Supp.)).
39. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1039-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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someone else.40
This problem need not long concern the courts when the issue
is reallocation of attorneys' fees under section 1021.5. The statute
allows fee awards only to prevailing parties. 41 This alone is
enough to relieve the courts of the task of weighing the validity of
the conflicting public interests asserted by the parties. In decid-
ing which party is to prevail, the courts must defer to the legisla-
ture when it enacts constitutionally sound legislation. That a
party prevailed in court necessarily means that the court found
his position consistent with legislative intent to further a particu-
lar public interest. Thus, the argument that a fee award is im-
proper because it favors one public interest over another should
be addressed to the legislature rather than the courts. The prohi-
bition of fee awards to losing parties preserves the credibility and
impartiality of the courts; the argument by some commentators
that it be abandoned42 is unpersuasive.
The requirement that an "important" public policy be enforced
before fees will be shifted has rarely been an obstacle to private
attorney general fee awards. This is a positive development. It
indicates the courts' recognition of the subjectivity inherent in the
criterion, and the inconsistency which goes hand-in-hand with
subjectivity. A liberal approach to this first criterion also avoids
the problem of deciding how far back the courts must trace the
policy foundation of an enforced statute in order to identify the
policy vindicated.
A Widespread Benefit
Section 1021.5 requires that "a significant benefit, whether pecu-
niary or nonpecuniary, [be] . . . conferred on the general public
40. See B. WEISBROD, J.F. HANDLER & N.K. KocmxsAR, PuBLic INTEREST LAW, AN
EcoNoIuc AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYsIs 7 (1978).
41. Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Comm. v. Board of Trustees, 89 Cal. App. 3d
274, 152 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1979), holds that the court does not have the power under
either section 1021.5 or Serrano III to award fees to a losing party. California
Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816, 153 Cal. Rptr.
672 (1979), holds that when a plaintiff prevails at trial and is awarded fees but
judgment on the merits is reversed on appeal, the plaintiff is not entitled to fees
for trial or appeal. Mandel v. Lackner, 92 Cal. App. 3d 747, 155 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1979),
holds that when fees are awarded to the plaintiff at trial, the defendant appeals
the dollar amount awarded, and the appellate court decreases the amount of the
award, the plaintiff is not entitled to fees on appeal because the defendant
'prevailed."
42. See Note, supra note 1.
or a large class of persons."43 This initially caused some observ-
ers to wonder whether the statute required a more tangible and
concrete benefit than that envisioned by Serrano 11.44 The courts
have now expressly held that this is not the case.45 This settled,
the question remains-How does this criterion restrict the award-
ing of fees?
Woodland Hills Resident Association examines the issue in
depth:
[The benefit] in some cases may be recognized simply from the effectu-
ation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy.... In Serrano
III itself, for example, our court recognized the propriety of an attorney
fee award under the private attorney general doctrine simply because of
the magnitude and significance of the fundamental constitutional princi-
ples involved in that litigation and the benefit that flowed to the general
public in having such principles enforced.4 6
The Woodland Hills Residents Association court apparently ac-
cepted the argument made by some commentators 47 that, at least
in some cases, the benefit the general public receives simply from
having the laws properly enforced is sufficient for the purposes of
the second criterion of the private attorney general doctrine.4 8
The court stresses, however, that this type of benefit will not al-
ways be sufficient. The court recognized that in every legal action
the public as a whole benefits through proper enforcement, but
unless the issues involved are of sufficient magnitude the benefit
will not be "significant." 49 In cases where the issues are less im-
portant, the trial court must determine "the significance of the
benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit ... in
light of all the pertinent circumstances." 50
43. CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
44. McDermott & Rothschild, The Supreme Court of California 1976-1977-Fore-
word: The Private Attorney General Rule and Public Interest Litigation in Califor-
nia, 66 CALIF. L. Rav. 138, 151 (1978).
45. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 939, 593 P.2d
at 212, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (1979); Rich v. City of Benicia, 98 Cal. App. 3d 428, 433,
159 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476 (1979).
46. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 939, 593 P.2d
at 212, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (1979) (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Nussbaum, Attorneys Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.
L. Rav. 301 (1979).
48. This broad conception of benefit conferred most likely had its genesis in
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). This case is probably the
most frequently cited federal case in California private attorney general cases as it
was the first to identify and utilize the exact same three criteria adopted by sec-
tion 1021.5. The case holds that where the housing relocation and environmental
study prerequisites to highway construction are enforced, the entire society bene-
fits because the policies involved "are nearly everyone's business." 57 FI.D. at
100.
49. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 939, 593 P.2d
at 212, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (1979).
50. Id. at 939-40, 593 P.2d at 212, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
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In some cases, the litigation will directly and immediately con-
fer a benefit on an easily identifiable class, and the widespread
benefit requirement will clearly be filflled.51 Where this is not
the case, Woodland Hills Residents Association seems to direct
the courts to determine how far-reaching a decision will be. The
important question to be asked is "What will be the future effect
of this particular decision, assuming no further judicial or legisla-
tive orders?"
In considering this question, the California courts have often
found that although the class which immediately benefits from
the litigation is quite small, the prospect that others will benefit in
the future warrants reallocation of the plaintiff's attorney's fees.5 2
In Rich v. City of Benicia, 3 for instance, the plaintiff challenged
the defendant city's allowance of the conversion of a single resi-
dence house (which was located across the street from plaintiff's
home) into a multi-residence. Plaintiff prevailed because the city
had failed to prepare an environmental impact report before au-
thorizing the conversion. The court found the immediate benefits
of the lawsuit to be confined to the plaintiff and a handful of other
neighbors. Nevertheless, the court held that there was a good
possibility the litigation may have improved city officials' atti-
tudes toward compliance with state environmental laws. It ob-
served that if this were true, all the residents of the city would
eventually benefit from the lawsuit. The court used this rationale
to award plaintiff attorneys' fees.
This recognition of benefits that are one step removed from the
four corners of the judgment is necessary to effectuate the policy
underlying the private attorney general doctrine. It is inherent in
the nature of public interest litigation that the resulting benefits
are not always concrete and often are reaped only in the future.
Therefore, if the private attorney general rule is to effectively en-
courage public interest litigation, the courts must recognize this
51. E.g., Mack v. Younger, 27 Cal. 3d 687, 612 P.2d 966, 165 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1980),
held constitutional a statute ordering the state attorney general to destroy convic-
tion records relating to certain marijuana offenses. All those whose records Will be
destroyed as a result of the litigation will directly benefit.
52. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). As a result of
that case the court ordered the state of Alabama to increase the quality of care in
state mental health institutions. The court found that all the residents of the state
benefitted, due to the prevalence of mental illness. See also County of Inyo v. City
of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1978).
53. 98 Cal. App. 3d 428, 159 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1979).
type of indirect benefit. If the courts narrowly define the benefits
which are considered sufficient, the inevitable result will be reluc-
tance of attorneys to litigate on the public's behalf for fear of be-
ing unable to make a showing of direct, immediate and
widespread benefits.
One approach to assessing these less tangible benefits is to iso-
late the statutory or constitutional policy which has been en-
forced and then determine the class of persons the policy was
intended to protect. If that class is sufficiently large and the de-
termination is made that the violative action of the defendant and
others similarly situated will actually be curtailed by the litiga-
tion, then the second criterion of section 1021.5 has been satisfied.
Wilderness Society v. Morton 54 adopts this approach. The Wilder-
ness Society court stated that the benefits conferred through en-
forcement of a public policy are sufficient when the violation
alleged by the plaintiff caused "great harm to important public in-
terests when viewed from the perspective of the broad class in-
tended to be protected by that statute."55 Similar reasoning was
employed in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher.56 In that case the plaintiff
successfully challenged the use of a search warrant by local po-
lice when the party searched was not suspected of criminal activ-
ity. The court implied that the benefits from the litigation flowed
to the general public because all individuals enjoy the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. Under the restrictive language of
Woodland Hills Residents Association57 and the holding of Rich,58
the class benefitted would be limited to those individuals living
within the jurisdiction of the defendant police department. Nev-
ertheless, it is a sufficiently large class to permit reallocation of
attorneys' fees.
Under this "class protected" approach, the courts' determina-
tion of what benefits have been conferred depends on the nature
of the policy found to have been enforced under the important
policy criterion.59 The broader the policy, the larger the class pro-
tected and the more likely the result that sufficient benefits have
been conferred.
Two recent California cases have each added a new hurdle that
must be cleared before a significant benefit is found to be con-
ferred. In Marini v. Municipal Court,60 the plaintiff successfully
54. 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
55. Id. at 1030.
56. 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
57. See notes 49-50 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 24-42 supra.
60. 99 Cal. App. 3d 829, 160 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1979).
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challenged a court order to abandon a county rehabilitory pro-
gram for drunk drivers. The basis of the order had been that state
law required use of a state program. The result of the litigation
was that the county district attorney was again given the discre-
tion to operate the county program. The court of appeals held
that no benefit was conferred on parties who would be eligible for
the program because the lawsuit did not result in a guarantee
that the program would be available. The court reasoned that be-
cause the benefits were contingent on the occurrence of another
event (in this case the decision of the district attorney to offer the
program) they were not sufficiently significant. This holding
seems inconsistent with the directive of Woodland Hills Residents
Association to make a "realistic assessment" of the resulting ben-
efits.61 The court in Marini did not consider whether in fact the
local program was continued. If it was, then the conclusion seems
inescapable that some very real benefits resulted from the
litigation.6 2
The second new hurdle was erected by Save El Toro Associa-
tion v. Days.63 In that case a California appellate court stated
that if the litigation's result could have been achieved through
some means other than legal action then a court should not view
the benefits conferred as having flowed from the litigation.64 Ap-
parently, the goal of the court was to force parties to exhaust all
alternative forms of action before turning to the courts. The de-
sire that all litigation be necessary is certainly a reasonable one,
but as the concurrence in Save El Toro Association recognizes,
there are some dangers in this approach. If the plaintiff must
prove that legal action was the last resort, meritorious public in-
terest litigation will be discouraged. The defendant is the only
party who knows what coercion is required before he will con-
form to the plaintiff's wishes. To place such a burden on the
plaintiff will convince even more attorneys that they cannot afford
to take on a case in the public's behalf. The solution suggested by
the concurrence 65 appears valid: allow the defendant to present
61. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
62. The result in Marini would have been the same despite the decision on
this issue because the court based its refusal to award fees on several grounds.
63. 98 Cal. App. 3d 544, 159 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1979).
64. The statement, id. at 555, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 583, is dicta.
65. Save El Toro Ass'n v. Days, 98 Cal. App. 3d 544, 555-56, 159 Cal. Rptr. 583-84
(1979).
evidence to show that the litigation was unnecessary but place no
burden on the plaintiff.
Under Woodland Hills Resident Association, the key question
in determining the benefit conferred by a lawsuit is how far-
reaching the judgment will be. The benefits must be tangible, but
they may accrue in the future and may be reaped by a group not
directly interested in the outcome of the litigation. Recognition of
this type of benefit is crucial, for such benefits are the goal of pub-
lic interest litigaton.
The Necessity and Burden of Private Enforcement
The purpose of the three-criteria test is to distinguish public
from private litigation. No element of the test is as effective in
this regard as the third criterion, which requires that private en-
forcement be necessary and that it result in a burden on even
successful plaintiffs. Although necessity and burden are actually
distinct requirements, only the latter merits detailed considera-
tion, because the necessity for private enforcement has become
consistently recognized. Private enforcement is necessary when
public entities fail to litigate the case. When public enforcement
is inadequate the requirement is met.66 Two reasons generally
are given to explain inaction by governmental enforcement bod-
ies: one governmental entity cannot be expected to sue another,67
and when the defendant is a private party the public enforcers
cannot be expected to take every meritorious case due to funding
and manpower constraints.68 These factors create a presumption
that when a private party litigates in the public interest without
help from government attorneys, public enforcement has proven
inadequate for enforcement of the policies involved. 69
The second element of this criterion, the burden factor, is ex-
plained in Serrano III as the requirement that the litigation place
"upon the plaintiff a burden out of proportion to his individual
stake in the matter."70 In other words, the costs which the plain-
tiff expects to incur must exceed the anticipated benefit of the
lawsuit to him as an individual. The plaintiff's motive is truly the
66. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 941, 593 P.2d
at 213, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (1979).
67. AFI-CIO v. California Employment Dev. Dep't, 88 Cal. App. 3d 811, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 193 (1979).
68. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal.
1973).
69. This Comment's author was unable to locate a case wherein the court de-
nied fees because public enforcement was deemed adequate.
70. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 46 n.18, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315 n.18, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 326-27 n.18 (1977).
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factor which distinguishes public litigation from private. The im-
portance of this element is illustrated by the fact that in the last
three years the most common basis for refusal of a section 1021.5
attorneys' fee award has been that the lawsuit is "self-servinol971
Where a plaintiff's personal interest in the litigation is limited
to his share of benefits sought for a large class, the burden re-
quirement is usually met. "Absent foundation funding,72 it is sim-
ply not economically rational for any single individual or small
group of individuals, to attempt to capture their minute portion of
aggregate good by incurring large expense to enforce a widely
held right."173 Conversely, if the plaintiff expects a net monetary
gain from the litigation it is clear that no burden results from the
lawsuit.
Satisfying the criterion becomes more difficult when the plain-
tiff reaps a substantial nonpecuniary gain as a result of the litiga-
tion. The California courts have recognized that a party may have
a nonmonetary interest in a suit which warrants the personal ex-
penditure of attorneys' fees, and they have denied fee awards ac-
cordingly.74 At least in the area of suits brought by criminal
defendants, however, the cases are in conflict. In Marini v. Munic-
ipal Court75 the court deemed the litigation "self-serving" be-
cause the plaintiff could have avoided a drunk driving conviction
by prevailing in the lawsuit.7 6 In Mack v. Younger,7 7 however, the
plaintiff sued to have his conviction record destroyed and was
awarded attorneys' fees when he prevailed. Although the benefits
71. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 90, 144 Cal. Rptr.
71, 76 (1978). See also Marini v. Municipal Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 829, 837, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 470 (1979); Bruno v. Bell, 91 Cal. App. 3d 776, 786, 154 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440-41
(1979).
72. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977), held
that the facts that the plaintiffs attorney received public funding and that plaintiff
was under no obligation to pay his attorney were not relevant to the determination
of the propriety of a private attorney general fee award. Id. at 47-48, 569 P.2d at
1315-16, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The extent of public and foundation funding, how-
ever, was held to be a proper consideration in setting the amount of the award. Id.
at 49, 569 P.2d at 1317, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
73. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
74. See, e.g., County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 71 (1978), where the plaintiff's personal environmental interests were consid-
ered great enough to warrant a refusal to shift the attorney fee burden.
75. 99 Cal. App. 3d 829, 160 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1979). For the facts of this case, see
text accompanying note 60 supra.
76. Id. at 837, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
77. 27 Cal. 3d 687, 612 P.2d 966, 165 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1980).
to the plaintiffs in the two cases are not identical, they are very
similar in terms of value to the individual plaintiff. The conflict is
caused by differing subjective valuations of the interest involved.
A certain amount of subjectivity is inevitable when a court is
asked to value an interest which has no dollar equivalent. Never-
theless, every effort should be made to limit subjectivity to a bare
minimum. Open questions and unclear standards reduce the pre-
dictability of a fee award, which undermines the policy behind
the private attorney general doctrine. In deciding Mack, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court should have distinguished or overruled
Marini.
Perhaps the best approach to resolving the burden criterion
would be to combine a cost/benefit analysis with a reasonable
person standard and apply the test when the litigation begins. If
a reasonable person, after deciding that expected costs exceed an-
ticipated benefits of the litigation, proceeds with the action then
the burden requirement is satisfied. This analysis must be
viewed as having been made at the instigation of the lawsuit. Fre-
quently in private litigation a party prevails only to discover that
he faces a net loss as a result of the litigation. In such a case, the
burden criterion is not satisfied; it is not the result but the expec-
tation which distinguishes public interest litigation from its pri-
vate counterpart. Therefore, hindsight should play no role in this
determination. In addition, the cost/benefit analysis should be
made independently of other economic factors; the financial situa-
tion of the parties is irrelevant.78
Application of the burden criterion requires an examination of
the plaintiff's motive. Where the potential benefit to the plaintiff
does not exceed the anticipated costs of the lawsuit, the litigation
is sufficiently burdensome to justify fee-shifting. The courts
should rely heavily on this criterion when the applicability of the
private attorney general doctrine is a difficult issue. It is this ele-
ment, the nature of the plaintiff's stake, which best distinguishes
public interest litigation from a private dispute.
ENFORCEMENT
The three criteria examined above are said to comprise the
formula of the private attorney general rule. In reality, however,
there is a fourth criterion: the requirement that the policy in-
volved be "enforced."
78. The courts have recognized that the ability of a party to pay his own attor-
neys' fees is irrelevant to the propriety of a private attorney general fee award.
See AFL-CIO v. California Employment Dev. Dep't, 88 Cal. App. 3d 811, 822, 152
Cal. Rptr. 193, 200 (1979).
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Resolution of the parties' dispute is not necessarily syno-
nomous with enforcement. When a plaintiff bases his claim on a
statute and prevails on the merits, and then the defendant is or-
dered to conform his behavior to the statute, clearly that statute
has been enforced and its underlying policy vindicated. This con-
clusion, however, does not necessarily follow when the parties
settle or plaintiff prevails on an alternate ground. Section 1021.5
requires that the right involved be "enforced" before a fee award
is given. It is uncertain that there has been enforcement when
the court never decides the applicability of the "important" right
or policy upon which the fee award depends. Due to frequent set-
tlements and judgments on alternate grounds, this question has
been described as "endemic to the application" of the private at-
torney general rule.7 9
The question of enforcement in the event of judgment on an al-
ternate ground was at issue in Woodland Hills Residents Associa-
tion. In Woodland Hills 1,80 the plaintiffs made two arguments:
the map for the subdivision which was being challenged did not
conform to the city's general plan, and the city failed to make the
required findings* that there was such conformity. The court
never reached the first contention but found that the defendant
was required to make the findings and had not done so.81 Never-
theless, plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees was based on enforce-
ment of the unadjudicated policy of conformity. The court held
that in some cases, enforcement does not depend on a binding
judgment on the policy involved.
[T]he fact that plaintiff is able to win his case on a 'preliminary' issue,
thereby obviating the adjudication of a theoretically more 'important'
right, should not necessarily foreclose the plaintiff from obtaining attorney
fees under a statutory provision. When a defendant's action is invalid on
a number of grounds, it would be both unfair and contrary to the legisla-
tive purpose of section 1021.5 to deprive a plaintiff of attorney fees simply
because the court decides the case in plaintiff's favor on a 'simpler' or less
'important' theory (citations).
82
The court recognized, however, that in some cases, the dispositive
issue will be far enough removed from the "important" policy to
invalidate application of section 1021.5. It is left to the lower
79. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 937, 593 P.2d
at 210, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (1979).
80. 44 Cal. App. 3d 825, 118 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979).
81. Id.
82. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 938, 593 P.2d
at 211, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 514 (1979).
courts to determine, "from a practical perspective," whether the
litigation served to vindicate the important right.
The court based its decision on federal precedent.83 The cases
cited hold that where both statutory and constitutional claims are
made, the constitutional issues may be considered "enforced" al-
though only the statutory issues are addressed by the court.84
One of the cases cited was Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Ad-
ams,85 which held that the undiscussed constitutional policy
should be considered enforced unless the claim is "'obviously
frivolous', 'plainly unsubstantial,' or 'obviously without merit.' "86
Thus, Woodland Hills Residents Association supports the position
that when a plaintiff prevails, the court will adopt a very deferen-
tial standard of review toward all of plaintiff's unadjudicated
claims for purposes of an attorneys' fee award.
It is on the question of enforcement without judgment that
three justices dissent in Woodland Hills Residents Association.
The dissenters argue that the majority's opinion will frustrate the
efficiency of the courts by forcing them to decide issues in order
to settle an attorneys' fee claim which otherwise need not be con-
sidered.87 This argument fails to recognize two factors. The first
factor is that application of the private attorney general doctrine
is not so trivial an issue as to be a waste of the court's time. The
legislature has determined that in some cases an attorneys' fee
award should be part of the remedy. It is the job of the judiciary
to make such decisions as are necessary to shape that remedy.
Secondly, under the liberal standard of review to be used,88 con-
sideration of the unadjudicated issues need not be exhaustive.
The court's job is finished when it finds that the unadjudicated
claim is not "obviously frivolous."
The courts have also held fee awards proper when no judgment
is made on the important policy because the parties settle. In
Northington v. Davis8 9 the court observed that "prior authorities
make it clear that 'voluntary' corrective action (by the defendant),
induced by litigation, may properly be considered a 'benefit' of
83. Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978); White
v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lund v. Affieck, 442 F. Supp. 1109 (D. RI.
1977); Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F. Supp. 891 (D. Or. 1977).
84. This holding is based on the judicial policy of avoiding constitutional inter-
pretation when the case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds. See Hagans
v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1966).
85. 436 F. Supp. 891 (D. Or. 1977).
86. Id. at 894.
87. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 953-54, 593
P.2d at 220-21, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 523-24 (1979).
88. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
89. 23 Cal. 3d 955, 593 P.2d 221, 154 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979).
[VOL. 18: 843, 1981] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the litigation in determining the propriety of an attorney fee
award."90 This holding is consistent with both California 1 and
federal92 precedent. To hold otherwise would discourage settle-
ment and promote unnecessary litigation.
An ill-advised California case on the question of enforcement is
Marini v. Municipal Court.93 The plaintiff in that case based his
claim on the constitutional principles of local autonomy 94 and
separation of powers. 95 Despite the fact that plaintiff prevailed on
these constitutional policies, the court held that they had not
been enforced to the degree envisioned by the private attorney
general doctrine.
[I]t is by no means clear that respondent's action enforced or vindicated
these principles in the requisite sense. No one disputed these princi-
ples .... In these circumstances Superior Court's order amounted to 'en-
forcement' or 'vindication' of the constitutional principles, if at all, only in
the broadest and most theoretical sense.96
In other words, a plaintiff does not enforce a policy by alleging,
proving, and alleviating a violation of that policy as long as the de-
fendant never disputes the existence or propriety or both of the
policy itself. If this rationale had been applied in Serrano III, no
fees would have been awarded. The defendant therein did not
dispute the existence and validity of equal protection but simply
alleged that there had been no violation of that policy. Policies do
not exist in vacuums; they take on meaning and significance only
when applied. A policy is vindicated not when it receives lip-serv-
ice but when it is properly applied. Thus, the holding of Marini is
incorrect.
It is clear that the courts have not viewed the issue of enforce-
ment as a major obstacle to application of the private attorney
general doctrine. This view is sound. One commentator has cor-
rectly observed that "Requiring a showing of both statutory vindi-
cation and a class wide benefit, would seem to entail a largely
90. Id. at 960 n.2, 593 P.2d at 224 n.2, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 527 n.2.
91. See, e.g., Center for Independent Living v. A.T.C. Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 408,
157 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1979).
92. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.
1970).
93. 99 Cal. App. 3d 829, 160 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1979).
94. CAT_ CONST. art. XI1 § 7.
95. CAT. CONST. art. III, § 3.
96. Marini v. Municipal Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 829, 837, 160 Cal. Rptr. 465, 470
(1979) (emphasis original).
redundant demonstration."9 7 Indeed, where a policy is intended
to confer certain benefits, and a court finds that a litigant's efforts
have established those benefits, it would appear to be settled that
the policy has been vindicated.
Surrs AGAINST PRIVATE PARTIES
Almost without exception, the California private attorney gen-
eral cases decided since Serrano III and the enactment of section
1021.5 have involved governmental entities as defendants. 98 Ap-
parently, the body of precedent regarding the private attorney
general doctrine has discouraged attorneys from handling public
interest litigation involving only private parties.
Use of the doctrine is being unnecessarily confined. There is no
reason why the doctrine should be inapplicable in suits between
private parties. One California case 99 has recognized that section
1021.5 implicitly authorizes fee shifting in wholly private litigation.
Furthermore, there is ample federal precedent for private attor-
ney general fee awards against private parties.100
The same three-criteria analysis applies regardless of whether
the defendant is public or private. The requirements of benefit
conferred and burden of the litigation ensure that the lawsuit is
not purely private in nature. There is, however, one difference
when a private defendant is named-the source of the funds to
pay the attorneys' fee award. When the defendant is a govern-
mental entity there is a basic notion of fairness at play which fur-
ther justifies shifting the costs of the litigation to the defendant.
It is the public which benefits from the litigation and it is the pub-
lic which pays the cost through expenditure of tax dollars. Al-
though preventing unjust enrichment is not the policy behind the
private attorney general doctrine, the fact that the recipient of the
benefits also pays for them makes the doctrine more acceptable.
In the case of a private defendant it is very possible that the party
forced to pay the fees will not share in the benefits created by the
litigation. This result seems inconsistent with the theory of loss
distribution, which is so widely accepted by California in other ar-
97. Note, Awarding Attorneys Fees to the 'Private Attorney General' Judicial
Green Light to Private Litigation in Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS U J. 733, 749
(1973) (emphasis original).
98. This Comment's author found only a single California private attorney
general case involving a private defendant. Franzblau v. Monardo, 108 Cal. App. 3d
522, 166 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1980).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1974);
Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Lee v.
Southern Home States Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Calnetics Corp. v. Volk-
swagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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eas of the law,10' because there is no assurance that the defend-
ant will be able to spread its loss over a large group. For this
reason, several commentators have advocated the creation of a
public fund out of which private attorney general fee awards
would be paid. 0 2
Shifting the costs of public interest litigation would seem more
equitable if the policy behind the reallocation of costs were pun-
ishment or deterrence, but it is neither.103 The policy is encour-
agement of public interest litigation in recognition of the
inadequacy of public enforcement. This being the case, fairness
dicates that the costs of public interest litigation be paid out of
the same fund that supports the inadequate public enforcement-
the public treasury.10 4 In the absence of such an appropriation,
the choice is between allowing financial constraints to continue to
discourage meritorious public interest litigation and occasionally
allocating costs to a party who has not benefitted. The former
seems the lesser of two evils.
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTmINE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The California Supreme Court has held that despite the fact
that section 1021.5 is directed expressly to the courts, under equi-
table judicial power as recognized in Serrano III, administrative
agencies may also award fees to a private attorney general. In
Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. P.U.C.,105 the supreme
court awarded to the plaintiff the attorneys' fees it incurred in ap-
pearing before the defendant agency. The court held that when
the agency proceeding is in essence an adjudication, the agency
possesses "well established and well understood judicial power,"
including the equitable power to award fees.lO6 Fees incidental to
plaintiff's participation in a ratemaking proceeding, however, were
denied. The court found that proceeding to be legislative in na-
ture and thus the analogy between the role of the courts and that
of the agency was inapplicable.
101. Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CALM. L. REV.
497 (1979).
102. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
HARv. L. REV. 849 (1975); Note, supra note 1.
103. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
104. Note, supra note 1.
105. 25 Cal. 3d 891, 603 P.2d 41, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1979).
106. Id. at 906, 603 P.2d at 50, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
For purposes of determining the applicability of the private at-
torney general doctrine in administrative proceedings, the distinc-
tion between adjudicatory and legislative action by administrative
agencies is sound. The court in Consumers Lobby Against Mo-
nopolies supported the distinction by observing that in a legisla-
tive proceeding there are numerous participants and intervenors
and it would be impossible to separate the contributions of each
toward the benefits which result from the proceeding. This is a
valid observation, but there is a more fundamental reason for dis-
tinguishing adjudication from legislation. Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court, explained:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.
That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the
future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied
thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.
107
This definition of the difference between adjudication and legisla-
tion has been accepted by the California courts. 08 Adjudication,
then, is application of existing law. In this setting, the private at-
torney general doctrine is proper, for the doctrine is founded on
the vindication of existing statutory or constitutional policies.
Vindication is achieved through proper application. Legislation,
by contrast, makes new law. General policies may be applied, but
the central activity is creation rather than application. Rights are
created, not vindicated, through legislation. As a California court
recently observed, "no person has a right to the adoption of legis-
lation."109 For this reason, the private attorney general rule, with
its emphasis on enforcement and vindication, is properly confined
to the adjudicatory setting." 0
Within the context of adjudication, fairness and adherance to
the basic policy involved require that the private attorney general
doctrine be extended to administrative proceedings. Very often,
due to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a
party is forced to present his claim to an administrative tribunal
before a court will hear his case."' The policy of encouraging
107. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
108. See, e.g., Orange County Cable Communications Co. v. City of San Cle-
mente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 171, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429, 433 (1976).
109. City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Comm., 76 Cal. App. 3d 381,
389, 142 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1978) (emphasis original).
110. In Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. P.U.C., 25 Cal. 3d 891, 603 P.2d
41, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1979), the dissent argued it was improper to deny fees for
plaintiff's participation in the ratemaking proceeding because that was an adjudi-
cation. Nevertheless, the California case law is clear that ratemaking is legislative
activity. City of Los Angeles v. City of Artesia, 73 Cal. App. 3d 450, 458, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 684, 689 (1977); Kahn v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 41 Cal. App. 3d 397, 409, 116
Cal. Rptr. 333, 341 (1974).
111. See 3 K.C. DAvIs, ADnm SAT=TI LAW TREATISE § 20.01 (1958).
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public interest litigation will be thwarted if litigants are forced to
take their cases to an administrative agency and then required to
bear their own costs in the proceeding." 2 The California
Supreme Court's opinion in Consumers Lobby Against Monopo-
lies takes the private attorney general doctrine one step further
toward achievement of its ultimate goal.
CONCLUSION
Public interest litigation has become increasingly prevalent and
has proved itself an adequate vehicle for protection of interests
which otherwise would go unrepresented." 3 Its considerable po-
tential, however, is threatened by financial burden. The private
attorney general doctrine seeks to remove this obstacle. When
the doctrine becomes established as a regularly and consistently
applied element of the public interest remedy then it will achieve
its goal. The California courts have taken important steps toward
this end by resisting the urge to allow subjectivity too great a role,
by recognizing future benefits of public interest litigation, by
adopting a liberal standard of review toward the question of en-
forcement, and by applying the doctrine to administrative pro-
ceedings wherein the agency is functioning in an adjudicatory
fashion. Continuation of this trend will inevitably improve the
quality of law enforcement in the California courts.
JEFF THOMAS
112. Judge Harold Leventhal was a strong supporter of altorney fee awards in
administrative proceedings:
Administrative law and regulation have been profoundly influenced by
the participation, in both agencies and courts, of public interest represent-
atives who have, identified issues and caused agencies and courts to look
squarely at the problems that otherwise would have been swept aside and
passed unnoticed .... The possibility of the award of attorneys' fees will
facilitate the participation of informal citizens' groups that do not have
large financial resources and will give the decision-making process the
benefit of their participation and assistance.
Leventhal, Attorneys Fees for Public Interest Representation, 62 A.B.A. JOURNAL
1134, 1134-35 (1976).
113. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281 (1976).

